Der Artikel ist weiterhin als ^^OTHERCONDITION^^ verfügbar.
Autor: Alessandro Salice
ISBN-13: 9783884051047
Einband: Taschenbuch
Seiten: 423
Gewicht: 604 g
Format: 220x147x28 mm
Sprache: Englisch

Intentionality

Basic Philosophical Concepts
Historical and Systematic Perspectives
I. Martin Lenz Intentionality without Objectivity?
Spinoza's Theory of Intentionality
II. Hans Burkhardt Intentionality in Leibniz's Philosophy
III. Anita Konzelmann Ziv Bernard Bolzano:
Intentionality and the Foundations of Morality
IV. Mauro Antonelli Franz Brentano's Intentionality Thesis
V. Robin Rollinger Anton Marty on Intentionality
VI. Stefano Besoli The Primacy of Functioning Intentionality in Edmund Husserl
VII. Alessandro Salice Phänomenologische Variationen.
Intention and Fulfillment in Early Phenomenology
VIII. Genki Uemura and Toru Yaegashi Alexander Pfänder on the Intentionality of Willing
IX. Jocelyn Benoist Why Should Inexistent Objects Be a Problem?
X. John Tienson On the Limits of Intentional Externalism
XI. Dale Jacquette Collective Intentionality in the Theory of Meaning
XII. Hans Bernhard Schmid Shared Intentionality and the Origins of Human Communication
XIII. Tetsuya Sakakibara The Intentionality of Caring
Intentionalität ist eine der zentralen Eigenschaften des Geistes. Denken, Wahrnehmen, Kommunizieren, Beabsichtigen, Hassen, Lieben, Versprechen sind intentionale Akte, weil sie die Fähigkeit haben, sich auf Gegenstände und Sachverhalte in der Welt zu beziehen. Die Debatte über Intentionalität thematisiert also ein Problem von fundamentaler Bedeutung für die Philosophie und verschiedene andere Disziplinen, denn es geht dabei um nichts Geringeres als um die grundlegende Frage, wie überhaupt der Geist in Beziehung zu der Welt treten kann.
Der vorliegende Band präsentiert bislang unveröffentlichte Aufsätze, die einige der wichtigsten historischen Drehpunkte der modernen Debatte über Intentionalität erörtern und originelle Beiträge zu relevanten Aspekten dieser Debatte liefern. Ihre Autoren sind international renommierte Spezialisten wie John Searle, Autor des Vorwortes, Mauro Antonelli, Jocelyn Benoist, Stefano Besoli, Hans Burkhardt, Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Dale Jacquette, Martin Lenz, Robin Rollinger, Tetsuya Sakakibara, Hans Bernhard Schmid, John Tienson, Genki Uemura, Toru Yaegashi, und der Herausgeber, Alessandro Salice.
Die Vielfalt der Perspektiven, unter der der Begriff der Intentionalität hier behandelt wird, verleiht dem Band philosophische Reichhaltigkeit und theoretische Prägnanz und macht ihn so zu einer unverzichtbaren Quelle für all diejenigen, die sich für die Intentionalitätstheorie und verwandte Themen interessieren.
Alessandro Salice
Preface

As John Searle highlights in his foreword to this volume, the concept expressed by the term "intentionality" lies at the core of an intricate bundle of problems and represents one of the most intensely debated issues of last decades within philosophy and other disciplines. Linguistically, "intentionality" is the nominalization of the predicate "intentional" or "being intentional," expressions which in some natural languages (most notably in English) also bear a non-technical sense, making them rather common in vernacular speech ("I didn't do that intentionally!"). Scientifically, these locutions are, however, employed with a specifically technical meaning: their (re-)introduction during the second half of the nineteenth century into the philosophical jargon - especially of the German speaking world - occurred with the aim of finding solutions for problems of a mainly psychological and episte-mological nature. This conferred to the term the technical sense with which it remains in use today within relevant literature.
What, then, is intentionality in this technical sense? As with many other fundamental concepts of philosophy, at first glance intentionality appears to be a relatively simple phenomenon. Indeed, one can easily arrive at a rather uncontroversial intui-tion of what intentionality is: every one of us experiences in everyday life that his/her actions, beliefs etc. are related in one way or another to the world: we feel or perceive something, we have desire and volition about something, and we also talk to someone, do things with someone, etc. In all these cases, one can say that we are intentionally directed to objects, persons, facts, events, etc., in the world. That is, our mind has the capacity to entertain relations with something (which can be different from the mind itself). Still, these basic intuitions represent merely a starting point for philosophical research, which has as one of its main purposes to use them in order to reach a conceptual clarification of the notions at stake.
The very simplicity that characterizes intentionality makes its philosophical analysis complicated and multifaceted (some scholars even argue for its logical primitiveness and hence for the impossibility of tracing this concept back to other, simpler concepts). Being such a simple notion, intentionality is a constituent of a broad class of more complex concepts. As a consequence, the view of intentionality one endorses has immediate consequences for all the notions in which this concept is included as constituent. Take knowledge, for instance: this concept is a complex one and it appears to entail the concept of intentionality: if one knows something, then his/her knowledge is about something and hence knowledge can be described as intentional. The description of knowledge would be thus influenced by the conception of intentionality to which one subscribes. Suppose now one denies that the mind can ever enter an intentional relation with the objects of the outer world, then one also eo ipso denies that there can be any knowledge of these objects.
To get a hint of the breadth of problems directly or indirectly touched by the notion of intentionality, it suffices to look at the range of entities to which the predicate "intentional" applies. In a first sense, a given class of psychical entities is said to be intentional: thinking, perceiving, wishing, willing, etc., are intentional because they are "directed towards" something. Even if all these experiences are of or about something, they all still differ from each other: if one hates someone, s/he is directed to this person in a different way than if s/he, say, loves or perceives this person. At this stage, it is interesting to note that the aforementioned non-technical meaning of the predicate "intentional" can be explained by referring to this first sense: usually, one is used to qualifying actions as intentional if the subject has the corresponding in
Autor: Alessandro Salice
ISBN-13:: 9783884051047
ISBN: 3884051040
Verlag: Philosophia
Gewicht: 604g
Seiten: 423
Sprache: Englisch
Sonstiges: Taschenbuch, 220x147x28 mm