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Autor: Anselm Ramelow
ISBN-13: 9783884051092
Einband: Taschenbuch
Seiten: 377
Gewicht: 492 g
Format: 220x140x25 mm
Sprache: Englisch

God

Philosophia Basic Philosophical Concepts
Reason and Reality
Philosophia Basic Philosophical Concepts
Anselm Ramelow (Editor) GOD Reason and Reality
ISBN 978-3-88405-109-2 © 2014 Philosophia Verlag GmbH. München
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Content Page
Foreword: The Name of God
R Sokolowski 09

What Do We Mean When We Say "God"?
R Spaemann 17

Monotheistic Rationality and Divine Names:
Why Aquinas' Analogy Theory Transcends both
Theoretical Agnosticism and Conceptual Anthropomorphism
T J White 37

Thomas Aquinas and Knowledge of a God
as the Goal of Philosophy
L Dewan 81

Bayesian Theism and the Interpretation of Bayesian Probabilities
S Gerogiorgakis 127

The "Suppositio" of Motion's Eternity
and the Interpretation of Aquinas' Motion Proofs for God
J FX Knasas 147

Shades of Simplicity
P Thom 179

The God of Life, the Science of Life,
and the Problem of Language
M Dodds 197

Divine Impassibility
W Wainwright 233

Divine Foreknowledge
and the Metaphysics of Time
L Zagzebski 275

The God of Miracles
A Ramelow 303

Abstracts 365
Contributors Biographies 371
Philosophia Basic Philosophical Concepts
Anselm Ramelow (Editor) GOD Reason and Reality
ISBN 978-3-88405-109-2 © 2014 Philosophia Verlag GmbH. München
____________________________________________________________

Abstracts to the new contributions in this collection

Robert Spaemann
What Do We Mean When We Say "God"?

Before we can answer the question, whether God exists, we need to understand what we mean by this question, i.e. what we mean by "God." Different relig-ions use the term "God," yet whether this term has the same referent, depends on its sense. Not all changes of the sense seem to imply a change of reference. The most basic sense seems to aim at a unique and inextricable unity of om-nipotence and goodness, both of which are taken as absolute and yet dependent on each other.

Thomas Joseph White, O.P.
Monotheistic Rationality and Divine Names: Why Aquinas' Analogy Theory Transcends both Theoretical Agnosticism and Conceptual An-thropomorphism

This essay examines the philosophical thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas' regard-ing analogical names for God. Aquinas' philosophical theory of analogy takes its shape from conversations with Aristotle, Proclus, Dionysius and Maimon-ides. The balance Aquinas strikes on analogical names for God seeks to avoid the twin extremes of a theory of divine names that is excessively apophatic, leaning toward agnosticism, and one that is excessively anthropomorphic, un-derstanding God through the prism of a univocalist conceptuality. The poise of this position is applicable in a contemporary context. After Kant and Heidegger it is common place to label all theistic projects as forms of onto-theology, in-evitably dominated by what some have termed "conceptual idolatry." Mean-while, influential trends in analytic philosophy often seek a clarity regarding the concept of God at the expense of a sufficient acknowledgement of the apo-phatic quality of all natural knowledge of God. Aquinas' arguments provide a way to think about affirmative knowledge of God that is not anthropomorphic and apophatic knowle Theoretical Agnosticism dge of God that is not agnostic. The project of analogical naming of God in the Thomist tradition remains one of enduring value and is formative for avoiding problematic ways of theistic and atheistic thinking.

Lawrence Dewan
Thomas Aquinas, and Knowledge of a God as the Goal of Philosophy

The present paper is meant to recall the Aristotelian doctrine of the natural human desire to know as finding its complete fulfillment in knowledge of the highest cause, otherwise called "a God". The most truly "philosophical" knowledge will grasp things in the light of the divine, the supreme cause. Phi-losophy as its most philosophical is best understood as "theology" or "divine science", as Aristotle indicated.
I show how this is seen by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century A.D., but that many, both then as still today, have taken the doctrine of a creator God as nec-essarily involving a doctrine of finite duration of the universe (looking towards the past). Thus, for such people God as creator seems unknowable to someone who allows no temporal beginning of a created universe.
Thomas was able to understand a doctrine of creation of the eternal (in the past) Aristotelian world, and saw that doctrine as professed by Aristotle. He could thus also understand the truth about the highest philosophy being "theol-ogy" (in one quite appropriate meaning of the word).
The god I find Thomas presenting in an Aristotelian philosophical portrait is quite readily viewed as creator and providence, knowing all things other than himself through and through. This does not mean that there is no affirmation by Thomas of a realm of theology "beyond philosophy." We show at the very outset that one must distinguish between natural and supernatural "theologies."

Stamatios Gerogiorgakis
Evidence and Principles in Bayesian Theism

I present Bayesian theism, i.e. Richard Swinburne's
Philosophia Basic Philosophical Concepts
Anselm Ramelow (Editor) GOD Reason and Reality
ISBN 978-3-88405-109-2 © 2014 Philosophia Verlag GmbH. München
___________________________________________________________________

Foreword: The Name of God

Robert Sokolowski

The title of this book is the single word "God," and this word is a name. The use of names in human language - as opposed to the use of grammatical terms - involves two essential features. First, names serve to distinguish, and hence identify, what we are concerned with. They target things for us. Second, names enable us to deal explicitly with the presence and absence of things. Through names, we can intend and speak about things when they are directly given to us and also when they are "distant," in any sense of this term. These two properties of the use of names occur in a distinctive way in the case of the word "God."
Naming involves distinctions: when we utter a name we signify this and implicitly not that, and both we and our interlocutors are put in mind of what we signify. The spoken word tethers our minds specifically to the thing we are discussing. We concurrently intend this, and we do so against the occurrent background of what is not this, and we do so be-cause the name of the thing has been pronounced.
The other essential feature of names is that they can in principle be used in both the presence and the absence of what they denote, and, moreover, in both instances they signify the very same thing: they desig-nate the thing that is identifiable in presence and absence. The ability to use names in speech and thinking gives us an enormous reach into the absent. It expands our minds. We can talk about the remote past and future, about things extremely far away, about prime numbers that have not been calculated, and even about things that are unimaginable and unperceivable; there is nothing that we cannot designate with our words. In fact, most of our speech is about absent things, but this predominance of the absent does not annul the fact that speech can also identify things that are present. We can come back to earth: we can name things that we directly encounter with our senses and understanding, things whose properties we can discover not by hearsay but by our own experience and activity; and when we do speak about what is present, we recognize it as the very same as that which we spoke about in its absence. This possibil-ity of naming the thing we directly see, this possibility of ostension, is what assures us that names in principle can express what truly is; they can express being. Names are essentially oriented toward the truth of things. Even when they range widely, they still are geared to expressing what is the case. We can, therefore, have some confidence or least some hope that when we use our words to set sail into the vast sea of the ab-sent, we can still be dealing with what truly is.
These two features of names, that they involve distinctions and that they identify things between presence and absence, occur in regard to the name that we use in speaking about God, but there they occur in a man-ner that is different from their usage in other contexts.

1. Identity and difference
In his essay in this volume, Lawrence Dewan, O.P. cites Aquinas as holding that the word "God" (or "god") names a nature, something that can be distinguished from other natures. Certainly this is true of pagan senses of the term, where the god or gods are one kind of being among others within the whole that we call the world. God or the gods are the highest, best, and most powerful entities, and in various ways we and the rest of the world owe our origin and our development to them, but even as divine they remain part of the whole of things. Divine entities are the first of all causes, the beings that are ultimately responsible for the way things are, but so long as such causes are the highest and best, as they a
Autor: Anselm Ramelow
ISBN-13:: 9783884051092
ISBN: 3884051091
Verlag: Philosophia
Gewicht: 492g
Seiten: 377
Sprache: Englisch
Sonstiges: Taschenbuch, 220x140x25 mm